Wormhole-Based Anti-Jamming Techniques in Sensor Networks by Cagalj, Mario et al.
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Techniques in Sensor Networks
Mario Cagalj, Srdjan Capkun, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux
Abstract—Due to their very nature, wireless sensor networks are probably the category of wireless networks most vulnerable to “radio
channel jamming”-based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. An adversary can easily mask the events that the sensor network should
detect by stealthily jamming an appropriate subset of the nodes; in this way, he prevents them from reporting what they are sensing to
the network operator. Therefore, even if an event is sensed by one or several nodes (and the sensor network is otherwise fully
connected), the network operator cannot be informed on time. We show how the sensor nodes can exploit channel diversity in order to
create wormholes that lead out of the jammed region, through which an alarm can be transmitted to the network operator. We propose
three solutions: The first is based on wired pairs of sensors, the second relies on frequency hopping, and the third is based on a novel
concept called uncoordinated channel hopping. We develop appropriate mathematical models to study the proposed solutions.
Index terms—Wireless sensor networks, security, jamming DoS attacks, wormholes, probabilistic analysis, simulations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN this paper, we investigate an attack where the attackermasks the event (event masking) that the sensor network
should detect by stealthily jamming an appropriate subset
of the nodes. In this way, the attacker prevents the nodes
from reporting what they are sensing to the network
operator. Timely detection of such stealth attacks is
particularly important in scenarios in which sensors use
reactive schemes to communicate events to the network
sink [14].
Event masking attacks result in a coverage paradox: Even if
an event is sensed by one or several nodes (and the sensor
network is otherwise fully connected), the network operator
cannot be informed on time about the event (see Fig. 1). We
will explain how the solution to this problem is far from
trivial. Proactive schemes, in which sensors spend their
time (and batteries) assessing the state of their communica-
tion links, are clearly suboptimal. Equally, jamming detec-
tion schemes are generally oversensitive and generate many
false alarms, making the system vulnerable to straightfor-
ward Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
We show that wormholes [5], which were so far
considered to be a threat, can be used as a reactive defense
mechanism. In our solution, thanks to channel diversity, the
nodes under the jamming attack are able to create a
communication route that escapes jamming; thus, appro-
priate information can be conveyed out of the jammed
region. The creation of a wormhole can be triggered by the
absence of an acknowledgment after several transmissions.
We explain the principle of probabilistic wormholes by
analyzing three approaches based on this principle. In the
first, a network with regular wireless sensor nodes is
augmented with a certain number of wired pairs of sensor
nodes, therefore resulting in a hybrid sensor network. In the
second, the deployed nodes (or a subset of them) organize
themselves as frequency hopping pairs (e.g., using Blue-
tooth). For both approaches, we compute the probability
that at least one wormhole can be formed. Finally, in the
third approach, we propose a novel antijamming technique
based on uncoordinated channel hopping. In this approach,
the nodes form low-bandwidth antijamming communica-
tion channels by randomly hopping between the given set
of orthogonal channels. This solution does not require the
nodes to be synchronized.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2,
we explain the need for the approach based on wormholes.
In Section 3, we focus on the solution based on wired pairs
of sensor nodes. In Section 4, we analyze the solution based
on frequency hopping. In Section 5, we analyze the solution
based on uncoordinated channel hopping. We give related
work in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7. Finally, in the
Appendix, we develop the mathematical model used in this
paper.
2 MOTIVATION AND EXISTING TRADE-OFFS
We consider the following scenario: A network of wireless
sensors is deployed to detect an event (e.g., the presence of
a thief in a museum). Upon detection of the event, a
(motion) sensor reports it to the network operator, who then
reacts accordingly. Any failure by the sensor to report the
event would result in the event being undetected by the
operator and would prevent any action to be taken (in our
example, the presence of a thief would be undetected). This
failure can occur for two main reasons: 1) faulty or
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compromised sensors and 2) unreliable or disrupted
communication links. In this work, we focus on the latter.
In a wireless sensor network, all mutual communication
between sensors and between the network operator and
sensors is wireless (and multihop) [2]. This makes it
possible for the attacker to jam the communication between
sensors and the operator. We show an example of this
scenario in Fig. 1. This figure shows an intruder (adversary)
whose presence is sensed by sensors located within the
exposure region (the region from which the adversary’s
presence can be sensed). It also shows that all communica-
tion from the sensors (located in the exposure region) to the
rest of the network (to their neighboring sensors) is jammed
by the adversary (and an additional jamming device—the
white square on the figure), resulting in the presence of the
adversary not being reported on time to the operator. This
example shows that an adversary can, by jamming
communication between the sensors, effectively delay the
report about his presence and, in some cases, prevent being
detected at all. Here, we speak about the “delay” as the
sensor nodes from the exposure region may eventually
detect the jamming activity of the adversary. However, this
is not an easy task considering the limited computational
capabilities of sensor nodes [14]. At the time a report arrives
at the network operator, it may already be too late to take
any meaningful action. Note also that the attacker can use a
smart jamming strategy to avoid being detected by the
nodes that do not sense its presence (the nodes outside the
exposure region—Fig. 1). Usually, packets in sensor net-
works have no protection apart from a simple CRC;
therefore, only a short jamming pulse is sufficient to
destroy a whole packet [10].
Furthermore, even if jamming is detected, the network
operator still cannot precisely locate the adversary; only the
boundary of the jamming region can be determined (Fig. 1).
Therefore, there is a clear need for defense mechanisms that
can ensure timely data delivery in spite of jamming attacks. In
this work, we assume the existence of an effective attack
detection mechanism (see [14]).
2.1 Proactive versus Reactive Sensor Networks
Generally, we distinguish two basic types of sensor
networks: proactive and reactive. Proactive networks
involve a periodic flow of data between sensor nodes and
the sinks. On the contrary, in reactive networks, packets are
sent only when some event of interest occurs and is sensed.
Reactive networks are characterized by low energy con-
sumption and, therefore, long network lifetimes.
In the case of proactive sensor networks, several simple
solutions are possible for ensuring that the operator receives
event reports or detects jamming. One solution consists of
having sensors periodically report their status to the
network operator (e.g., upon query from the operator): If
a sensor does not report its status within an expected
period, the operator can request a retransmission or
conclude that the communication from that sensor is
prevented by an adversary. If these status reports are sent
very frequently, sensor batteries will be exhausted in a short
time, whereas if they are sent infrequently, the batteries
will last longer, but the time elapsed between an event
happening and its reporting can be long and might render
the alarm useless. Another similar solution is that sensors
hold the list of their neighbors and periodically poll them to
check if the communication links between them are still
valid. This solution has similar drawbacks as the first
proposal, as it either has high energy cost (if the polls are
frequent) or opens a time window within which an event is
undetected (if the polls are not frequent).
These and similar proactive solutions require the sensors
to periodically communicate even if no event has occurred.
Furthermore, these solutions do not ensure that the network
operator is informed about the event immediately after it
happens. We therefore argue that, instead of being
proactive, in many applications, event reporting needs to
be reactive, saving energy (as the sensors communicate only
when an event is detected) and enabling the network
operator to be informed about an event within a reasonably
short time period.
Reactive event reporting is, however, vulnerable to
jamming. If the communication from a sensor to the
operator is jammed, the operator will not raise any alarm
as it does not expect any reports to come at any given time.
It is therefore important to ensure that, if a sensor detects an
event, it can communicate this event to the network
operator despite adversary’s jamming.
2.2 Our Solution: Probabilistic Wormholes
In our solution, a portion of pairs of sensor nodes create
(probabilistically) communication links that are resistant to
jamming. By not requiring all the sensor nodes in the
network to have this capability, we actually trade off the
network robustness with the network complexity (and cost).
For the given randomly located adversary (attacker), there
is a positive probability that a sensor node residing in the
exposure region of the attacker forms a (multihop) path
from the exposure region to the region not affected by
jamming in such a way that this path is not affected by
ongoing jamming. We call such a path a probabilistic
wormhole. An example of probabilistic wormhole, realized
through wires, is shown in Fig. 2a.
In the following three sections, we present and analyze
three mechanisms to achieve timely event reporting,
namely: 1) wired pairs of sensor nodes, 2) coordinated
frequency-hopping pairs, and 3) uncoordinated channel-hopping
pairs of nodes.
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Fig. 1. The coverage paradox—even if an intruder is detected by the
sensor nodes (and the network is connected), the network operator
cannot be informed on time. The intruder moves in the network and
gets detected by the nodes located in the exposure region; the intruder
then stealthily jams all communication within the jamming region (the
white square represents a jamming device left behind by the intruder
on his way).
3 WORMHOLES VIA WIRED PAIRS OF
SENSOR NODES
In this solution, we propose augmenting a wireless sensor
network with a certain number of pairs of sensor nodes that
are each connected through a wire. Connected sensor nodes
are also equipped with wireless transceivers, just like
regular sensor nodes. As a result, we obtain a hybrid sensor
network as shown in Fig. 2a: Isolated points represent
regular nodes and connected pairs are denoted as con-
nected points. A similar form of hybrid sensor network
already appears in the context of the NIMS project [6] and
in the work by Sharma and Mazumdar [11].
3.1 Rationale
We now explain the operating principles underlying the
approach based on wired pairs of sensor nodes. We denote
with d the length of the wire connecting a pair of nodes; we
assume all pairs to be connected with wires of the same
length. Assuming random deployment of connected pairs
(e.g., by throwing them from an aircraft), the distance
between the nodes of a given connected pair, once the pair
lands in the field, is a random variable taking values from
interval ½0; d. We further denote with Rt the transmission
range of the wireless transceivers mounted on the sensor
nodes. Let us now consider the scenario shown in Fig. 2a. In
this scenario, the attacker ðAÞ, represented by sign x,
stealthily jams the region (called jamming region) within
jamming range Rj. We call the exposure region the region
that surrounds the attacker and from which the attacker’s
presence can be detected. As can be seen in Figs. 2a and 2b,
we model the exposure region by a circle centered at the
location of the attacker. We denote with Rs the radius of the
exposure region. The exposure region is related to the
sensing capabilities of the employed sensors, which is the
reason for using subscript s in Rs. Note, however, that the
notion of the exposure region is much broader. For
example, when the attacker jams an area, the nodes whose
transmissions are affected by this attack can deduce that an
attack is taking place by observing multiple failures to
receive the ACK from their intended destinations. In this
case, all such nodes make the exposure region.
In order to prevent any report (e.g., a report about the
attacker’s presence), generated by the regular nodes located
within the exposure region, from successfully leaving the
exposure region, the attacker simply jams the area within
jamming rangeRj  Rt þRs. In this situation, the connected
pairs serve as a rescue. In our example in Figs. 2a and 2b, the
connected pair (1, 2) creates a link resistant to jamming from
the exposure region. When node 1 senses the presence of the
attacker, it makes use of the wired channel to communicate a
short report to its peer node 2. As the wired channel between
nodes 1 and 2 is not affected by the jamming activity of the
attacker, the report sent by node 1 is successfully received by
node 2. In turn, node 2 simply transmits (broadcasts) this
report using the wireless transceiver with transmission
range Rt. A node (e.g., node 3 in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b) that is
located within transmission range Rt from node 2 and
outside of the jamming region will potentially receive the
report and pass it further, possibly over multiple hops, to the
sink. Therefore, the 2-hop path between nodes 1 and 3 can be
thought of as a wormhole that is resistant to ongoing jamming
activity by the attacker.
Naturally, the attacker can simply increase the jamming
region in such a way that the attacker also jams node 3.
However, in the same way, the network operator can
further increase the transmission range (Rt) of the wireless
transceivers, the length of the wire ðdÞ, as well as the
exposure region (by deploying more advanced sensors with
more advanced sensing capabilities). In addition, if a
jamming signal is stronger, the probability that it gets
detected and reported increases. In the following section,
we develop a model that allows us to better understand the
potential benefits of changing the system parameters: Rt,
Rs, d, and Rj, as well as the node density.
3.2 Performance Analysis
We assume the regular sensor nodes to be deployed
randomly with uniform distribution in the deployment
region D (Fig. 2b). The deployment region D is modeled by
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Fig. 2. Probabilistic wormholes via wired pairs of sensor nodes: (a) Hybrid sensor network with randomly deployed sensor nodes: Isolated points are
regular nodes, connected points represent sensor nodes connected through a wire. Connected pair (1, 2) and regular node 3 create a wormhole that
leads out of the exposure region to the region that is not jammed. (b) Geometry used in the analysis of the solution based on probabilistic wormholes.
a DD square, D <1. We denote with n the number of
regular nodes deployed in D. We further approximate
exposure and jamming regions with circles of radius Rs and
Rj, respectively (the Boolean model). Finally, we assume
that the jamming range satisfies Rj  Rs þRt. The center
point ðxA; yAÞ 2 D of the exposure (jamming) region
represents the location of the attacker (Fig. 2b). In our
model, we assume both exposure and jamming regions to
be contained completely within the deployment region.
This is to avoid cumbersome technicalities with boundary
regions. Without loss of generality, we set ðxA; yAÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ
(Fig. 2b). We also assume that the attacker is ignorant of the
locations of connected pairs.1 In other words, the attacker’s
location is assumed to be independent of the locations of the
connected pairs.
For the given attacker, located at point ðxA; yAÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ,
we calculate P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ, the probabil-
ity that at least one wormhole exists from the corresponding
exposure region into the region not affected by the attacker’s
jamming activity.
Let P ½S be the probability that an arbitrary pair forms a
wormhole from the exposure region around ðxA; yAÞ to the
area not affected by jamming. Let ps denote the value of
P ½S. By assumption: 1) the location of any connected pair
ði; jÞ is independent of the attacker’s position ðxA; yAÞ, and
2) the positions of the connected pairs are sampled from the
same distributions and independently. Therefore, ps is
equal for all the deployed connected pairs. Let us denote
with K the number of connected pairs deployed randomly
and independently. Then, we have:
P

at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ
 ¼
1 ð1 psÞK  1 eKps ;
ð1Þ
where the approximation is valid for small ps and large
K. In our analysis (see the Appendix), we obtain a
complex expression for probability ps ¼ P ½S that we
solve numerically. We validate our model in the follow-
ing section by simulations.
Assume now that we want to achieve
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ  pw;
where pw is a targeted probability. Let K0 denote the
critical (minimum) number of connected pairs for which
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ ¼ pw holds. Then, from
(1), we have the following result:
Theorem 1.
K0 ¼ lnð1 pwÞ
lnð1 psÞ  
lnð1 pwÞ
ps
; ð2Þ
where ps is given by (18) in the Appendix.
The result from Theorem 1 is common in stochastic
geometry.
3.3 Simulations and Model Validation
We investigate the proposed analytical model (see the
Appendix) bymeans of simulations.We evaluate probability
P ½at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ as a function of parameters
K, Rs, n, and d. In our simulations, we set Rj ¼ Rs þRt. For
each parameter, we perform 20 experiments as follows: For
each different value of a given parameter (i.e.,Rs,K, n, d), we
first randomly generate the network topology with n regular
nodes andK connectedpairs (see Fig. 2a).Next,we randomly
throw N ¼ 500 jamming regions (circles of radius Rj) in the
deployment area of size DD. Then, we count the number
nW  N of jamming regions for which there is at least one
wormhole. From this, we calculate the relative frequency
fW ðNÞ ¼ nW=N . Finally, we average the results obtained
from 20 experiments and present them with a 95 percent
confidence interval.
The results are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, together with
numerical results obtained from the analytical model
developed in the previous section (and the Appendix). As
we can see from the figures, the analytical model predicts
quite accurately P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ. Other
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Fig. 3. P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ and relative frequency fW ð500Þ versus (a) the size of the exposure region Rs and (b) the number of
connected pairs K. We use a 95 percent confidence interval.
1. This assumption is more legitimate in the context of the solution based
on frequency-hopping pairs (studied in Section 4). Note, however, that
information about the locations of connected pairs becomes less relevant as
the density of the connected pairs increases.
interesting conclusions can be drawn from the figures. We
can see that the increase in either Rs or K results in a nearly
linear increase of P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ. We can
further see that the best “investment” for the network
operator is to increase the size of the exposure region
(e.g., by using more advanced sensing mechanisms). For
example, an increase of Rs of 20 units (from 80 to 100)
for K ¼ 300 and d ¼ 200 results in an increase of
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ of around 0.1 (Fig. 3a).
However, an increase of K of 100 units (300 to 400)
for d ¼ 200 and Rs ¼ 100 results in nearly the same
increase of P ½at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ, i.e., around
0.12 (Fig. 3b). Therefore, we can trade off the number of
wired pairs required with the size of the exposure region
(for example, by using more advanced sensing technol-
ogy). The advantage of increasing Rs versus K can
easily be seen by taking the first derivative of Pw 
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ with respect to ps and
K. From (1), we have
@Pw
@ps
 KeKps and @Pw
@K
 pseKps :
Since ps increases in Rs, it follows readily that it is more
advantageous to increase Rs than K. From Figs. 3a and 3b,
we can further see that the cable length plays a major role;
we note, however, that this is partially because we take
Rj ¼ Rt þRs.
From Figs. 4a and 4b, we observe that increasing n and d
is beneficial only until a certain saturation point; this can be
easily deduced from our model developed in the Appendix.
Note that the average distances between connected peers
are significantly shorter than the maximum length d. The
average distance between two connected nodes is around
0:45 d (which is consistent with the expected distance
between two randomly selected points from a disk of radius
d=2 [12]).
The results from this section show that, although feasible,
the solution based on pairs of nodes connected throughwires
is expensive in terms of the number ofwires needed and their
length. In the following section, we propose and analyze an
alternative and “light” approach to creating wormholes.
4 WORMHOLES VIA FREQUENCY HOPPING PAIRS
The solution based on pairs of nodes connected through
wires has the obvious major drawback that it requires
wires to be deployed in the field. Moreover, as we saw
in Section 3.3, in order to achieve a reasonably high
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ, the number of connected
pairs (and, therefore, wires) to be deployed can be very
high. In this section, we propose a solution similar to the
previous one, with the only difference being that the pairs
are formed exclusively through wireless links resistant to
jamming. By using a wireless link, not only do we avoid
cumbersome wires, but we can also afford longer links
between pairs. As we saw in Section 3.3 (Fig. 4b), the
increase in d (maximum length of a wire) has a profound
impact on P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ.
4.1 Rationale of Frequency Hopping (FH) Pairs
In the solution based on coordinated frequency hopping
pairs, we distinguish two types of sensor nodes. The first
type are regular nodes equipped with an ordinary single-
channel radio. The second type are sensor nodes equipped
with two radios: the regular radio and a radio with
frequency-hopping (FH) capability (e.g., Bluetooth). We
note that there already exist several sensor platforms with
FH capabilities [1]. It is important to stress, however, that
we do not propose to equip all the nodes in the network
with FH radios (a case study of Bluetooth sensor networks
can be found in [8]). The reason is that FH radios impose a
substantial overhead on sensor nodes in multihop networks
[8]. The need for “synchronization” (at multiple levels)
between senders and designated receivers (synchronization
of hopping sequences, time synchronization) may be a
major reason against the usage of FH radios in multihop
wireless sensor networks [8].
Instead, we propose deploying a certain number of FH-
enabled nodes along with the regular nodes. We assume
that the attacker cannot jam the employed FH radio. Once
deployed (in the bootstrapping phase; no attack takes place
yet), each FH-enabled node begins to look for another FH
node among its FH neighbors. Once two FH neighboring
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Fig. 4. P ½at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ and relative frequency fW ð500Þ versus (a) the number of regular nodes n and (b) the maximum wire
length d. We use a 95 percent confidence interval.
nodes agree to form an FH pair, they generate a random
frequency-hopping sequence (which is, ideally, unique in
the 2-hop neighborhood of a given pair). In this work, we
restrict each FH node to being a member of, at most, one FH
pair. We denote with dFH the transmission range of the FH
radio (i.e., FH nodes), where dFH may be different from the
transmission range Rt of regular nodes (radio).
The solution based on FH pairs is similar to the previous
one based on wired wormholes. Here again, our goal is to
ensure that, with a high probability, FH pairs form at least
one wormhole in the event of a jamming attack (see Fig. 2a).
The important difference with respect to the solution based
on wires is that the formation of FH pairs takes place once
the nodes are deployed in the field—the opportunistic pairing
process. FH hopping-enabled nodes will use some form of a
pairing protocol to discover their FH-enabled neighbors and
to eventually form a pair with one of them. A simple
opportunistic pairing protocol would be to let every node
advertise its availability until it makes an FH pair with a
randomly selected “available” node or it fails to find some
“free” (available) neighbor. The details of such a pairing
protocol are out of the scope of this work. We expect it to be
probabilistic in nature2 (for example, due to the probabil-
istic channel access mechanisms). For this reason (and
because of the random deployment of FH enabled nodes), it
is very likely that some FH nodes will not find any “free”
FH neighbor.
Consider the example in Fig. 5, where FH nodes 1, 2, and
3 are all neighbors to each other (i.e., they are located within
dFH of each other) and FH node 4 has no neighbors. The
link between nodes 2 and 3 means that they form an FH
pair. Since we allow each node to be a member of at most
one FH pair, node 1 has no “free” FH neighbors to form a
pair with. Likewise, node 4 has no FH neighbors at all and,
so, remains “unpaired” too. From this simple example, we
can see that the event that some FH node i forms a pair with
its FH neighboring node j is not independent of the status of
the other FH nodes from the i and j’s neighborhood. This
fact makes the analytical study of the FH pairs-based
solution far more difficult. We will now show how to
effectively overcome this difficulty.
4.2 Analysis of the FH Pairs-Based Solution
Again, our goal is to estimate
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ;
the probability that at least one FH pair forms a wormhole
from the exposure region to the region not affected by
jamming. As we discussed in the previous section, due to the
probabilistic nature of the pairing process, not all deployed
FHnodes are guaranteed to be amember of some FHpair. To
better understand the extent of this potential difficulty, we
have conducted the following simulations: We randomly
throw a certain number of FH-enabled nodes in a deploy-
ment region of sizeDDwithD ¼ 3;000. Then, we combine
FH nodes randomly into FH pairs, with the restriction that a
single FH node can be a member of at most one FH pair and
two FHnodes canmake a pair only if they arewithin distance
dFH ¼ f50; 100; 200; 300g of each other. For each different
transmission range and the number of FHnodes,we generate
100 network instances. For each instance, we count the
number of FHpairs created. The average number of FHpairs,
with 95 percent confidence intervals, is presented in Fig. 6.
From this figure, we can see that, except for modest
transmission ranges (e.g., dFH ¼ 50), the number of created
FH pairs is sufficiently high. As expected, the larger the
density of the FH nodes is, the larger the number of created
FH pairs is. Therefore, with an appropriately selected radio
transmission range of FH nodes, we can ensure that almost
all of the FH nodes will be effectively used.
From the same set of simulations, we have extracted two
additional values, namely, the average distance between
two FH nodes that make an FH pair (the normalized
average distance of an FH link) and the corresponding
standard deviation. In Fig. 7, we show the normalized
average distance between two FH peers and the corre-
sponding standard deviation as functions of the number of
the deployed FH nodes. We normalize the distance with
respect to the corresponding radio transmission range dFH .
A striking result in this figure is that the normalized
average distance of an FH link is approximately 0:66  23 ,
irrespective of dFH . Moreover, the standard deviation is
approximately 0.23.
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2. An alternative would be to use a similar approach as in the
probabilistic key predistribution schemes [4], where the nodes would be
preloaded with a certain number of FH sequences chosen randomly from a
common pool.
Fig. 5. Opportunistic FH pairing process: The thick line connecting FH
nodes 2 and 3 means that they form an FH pair, while FH nodes 1 and 4
remain “unpaired” (dFH is the radio transmission range of the FH nodes).
Fig. 6. Ratio of created FH pairs versus maximum possible number of
FH pairs (¼ 1=2 the number of FH enabled nodes deployed); we use
a 95 percent confidence interval.
This result reminds us of the process of choosing a
random point ðx; yÞ from the unit circle centered at point
ðx0; y0Þ. Then, we can calculate the expected distance E½L
between points ðx; yÞ and ðx0; y0Þ to be E½L ¼ 23 and the
standard deviation STDðLÞ ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1=18p  0:2357. Indeed,
fLðxÞ ¼ 2x
r2
¼ 2x
12
¼ 2x; EL ¼ Z 1
0
xfLðxÞ ¼
Z 1
0
2x2 ¼ 2
3
;
STDðLÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃZ 1
0
x2fLðxÞ  E

L
 2s ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
18
r
:
ð3Þ
This result suggests that the random process of oppor-
tunistic FH pairing exhibits behavior similar to the process
of choosing a random point from the circle of radius dFH
centered at the given FH node. To confirm this hypothesis,
we performed another set of experiments. For the given
transmission range dFH , we partition length dFH into a
certain number of mutually exclusive intervals, each of the
same size . Then, we generate a large number of networks
(for the fixed parameters dFH , K, and D) and determine the
relative frequency with which distances between created
FH pairs fall into each interval. Finally, we compare the
relative frequency with the corresponding probability
obtained from the probability density function given in (3).
As can be seen from Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b, the relative
frequency matches the probability calculated from the
postulated probability density function (3) very well. This
is the case even for low values of dFH and K.
This matching inspires the following approach to
modeling the creation of a random FH pair in the
opportunistic pairing protocol: Consider an FH node i
that is a member of some FH pair. Then, we model the
creation of this FH pair, from the FH node i’s point of
view, as choosing a random point from the circle with
radius dFH , centered at node i. Moreover, since FH nodes
are deployed randomly and independently of each other,
the creation of one FH pair is independent of the creation
of another FH pair in the random point choosing model.
Then, from the independence between different created FH
pairs, P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ can be calculated
as follows:
P

at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ

¼ 1 1 pFHs
 KFH 1 eKFHpFHs ; ð4Þ
where pFHs is the probability that a single FH pair forms a
wormhole and KFH is the number of created FH pairs.
In order to calculate pFHs , we can proceed as in the case
of the probability ps for wired pairs. However, instead of
calculating pFHs from scratch, we prefer to reuse the model
developed for wired sensor pairs (Section 3.2 and the
Appendix) by exploiting the similarity between the solution
based on wired pairs and the solution based on FH pairs.
In this direction, we will first establish the relationship
between the maximum wire length d and the transmission
range of FH node, dFH . As we will see, the important
difference between wired pairs and FH pairs is that the
latter achieve the same P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ
with transmission ranges dFH smaller than the maximum
wire length d, i.e., dFH=d  0:6791.
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Fig. 7. Normalized average distance between FH peers versus the
number of FH enabled nodes deployed (“avg”—average, “stdev”—
standard deviation).
Fig. 8. Matching between postulated pdf and the relative frequency with which outcomes fall in different intervals of size  ¼ 5: (a) dFH ¼ 50,K ¼ 50,
number of experiments ¼ 3;500; (b) dFH ¼ 100, K ¼ 500, number of experiments ¼ 10;000.
Note first that there is a subtle difference in the way we
model the deployment of pairs connected through wires
and the way we model the creation of FH pairs. In the first
case, we use the so-called “disk line picking” model, i.e.,
two points are selected randomly and independently from
the disk of radius d2 (d is the maximum cable length). A well-
known result from stochastic geometry says that the
expected distance between two randomly selected points
from the disk of radius d2 is
128
45
d
2 [12]. In the second case, one
point (FH node i) is given and its FH peer is modeled as a
random point selected from the circle of radius dFH ,
centered at the location of FH node i. We have established
above that the expected distance between two such selected
points is 23 dFH . Now, the key step in our modeling is that,
for the given dFH , we scale d (used in the expressions of
Section 3.2) in such a way that the expected distances
between the random points in the “disk line picking” model
and the random points in the model describing the creation
of FH pairs are equal, that is, 12845
d
2 ¼ 23 dFH . From this, it
follows:
d  dFH
0:6791
: ð5Þ
Now, in order to calculate
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ
for the solution based on FH pairs, we first scale d using (5)
and use d to calculate ps ¼ P ½S (see Section 4.3). Then, for
the given number of deployed FH nodes, we estimate the
average number of created FH pairs (see Fig. 6) and use this
value as K in (1). In the following section, we evaluate the
proposed model.
4.3 Simulations and Model Validation
We investigate the proposed analytical model by means of
simulations. We evaluate probability
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ
as a function of parameters KFH , Rs, dFH , and n. As before,
we set Rj ¼ Rs þRt. For each parameter, we perform
20 experiments as follows: For each different value of a
given parameter, we first randomly generate the network
topology with n regular nodes and KFH FH nodes. To
simulate the FH pairing protocol, we randomly iterate
through the FH nodes ðKFHÞ and, for each unmatched FH
node i, we try to find another unmatched FH node from
i’s neighborhood. In case node i has more than one free FH
neighbor, i is matched with a randomly selected one; note
that some FH nodes may happen to remain unmatched at
the end of the pairing protocol.
Next, we randomly throw N ¼ 500 jamming regions
(circles of radius Rj) in the deployment area of size DD.
Then, we count the number nW  N of jamming regions
for which there is at least one wormhole. From this, we
calculate the relative frequency fW ðNÞ ¼ nW=N for each
different value of the given parameter. Finally, we average
the results obtained from 20 experiments and present
them with a 95 percent confidence interval. To obtain the
numerical results, for each value of dFH , we first scale d
using (5) and then we plug the resulting d into (1) to
obtain P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ. The values of K
are obtained as the average number of created FH pairs
for different numbers of FH nodes KFH (see Fig. 6).
The results are shown in Figs. 9 and 10, together with
numerical results obtained from the analytical model. In the
figures, Kavg represents the average number of created FH
pairs. As we can see from the figures, the analytical model
quite accurately predicts P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ.
The results obtained have identical properties as in the
solution based on pairs connected through wires. The
important difference is that the FH approach achieves the
same P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ with transmission
ranges dFH smaller than the maximum wire length d, i.e.,
dFH=d  0:6791 (5).
5 WORMHOLES VIA UNCOORDINATED
CHANNEL-HOPPING
The solution based on the coordinated FH pairs, though
simple, still requires a certain level of synchronization
between the FH nodes that make a pair. In this section, we
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Fig. 9. P ½at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ and relative frequency fW ð500Þ versus (a) the size of the exposure region Rs and (b) the average number of
connected pairs Kavg. We use a 95 percent confidence interval.
explore the feasibility of a completely uncoordinated
channel-hopping approach. In this solution, we seek to create
probabilistic wormholes by using sensor nodes that are
capable of hopping between radio channels that ideally
span a large frequency band. The major difference between
channel-hopping (CH) and frequency-hopping is that, with
the former one, an entire packet is transmitted on a single
channel. In other words, with channel-hopping, sensor
nodes hop between different channels (frequencies) in a
much slower way (per packet basis), as compared to
classical frequency-hopping (e.g., Bluetooth).
5.1 Rationale of the Approach
In this approach, we can imagine that a part of the deployed
nodes—or all of them—have channel-hopping capabilities.
Regular communication still takes place over a single
channel common to all the nodes. We do not assume
channel hopping nodes to be either coordinated or
synchronized (see an example of scheduling in Fig. 11).
However, we assume that all the channel-hopping nodes
share the common pool of orthogonal channels.
When a channel-hopping sensor node senses the pre-
sence of an attacker, it first tries to transmit the report about
this event to its neighbors. Each such report should be
acknowledged by the intended receivers. In case no (or very
few) acknowledgment is received, the node can conclude
that an attacker is obstructing his communication. The node
then switches to the channel-hopping mode and repeatedly
transmits the same report over different orthogonal
channels. In order for this report to potentially be received,
the transmitting node must have at least one neighbor (with
channel-hopping capabilities) that listens on one of those
channels. Note that we do not assume the two nodes to be
synchronized or coordinated. Therefore, the two nodes
will happen to occupy the same channel only with some
probability. Note also that the attacker can potentially jam
this channel. We can likewise envision a scenario in which a
set of specialized relaying-only nodes are deployed. Relay-
ing-only nodes would spend most of the time in the
listening mode, hopping randomly among the available
orthogonal channels.
When such a node happens to receive the report from the
exposure region, it can forward the report further either
over the regular channel or by entering in the channel
hopping mode.
For this approach to work, we have to ensure that it is
not sufficient for the attacker to destroy a whole packet by
simply flipping one or a few bits of the packet. Otherwise, a
fast-hopping attacker could easily destroy all the packets
transmitted by quickly hopping between the operational
channels and jamming every channel for a very short
period of time. By encoding packets using appropriate
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Fig. 10. P ½at least one wormholejðxA; yAÞ and relative frequency fW ð500Þ versus (a) the number of regular nodes n and (b) the transmission range of
FH enabled nodes d. We use a 95 percent confidence interval.
Fig. 11. (a) A network example with channel-hopping listeners. (b) Example of scheduling for nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6, with Tl ¼ 2Tp (the numbers above
the packets represent channel indexes).
error-correcting codes (e.g., low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes), we can achieve a certain level of resistance against
jamming [10], which we capture by the notion of a jamming
ratio (defined in the following section). In this way, we can
“keep” the attacker “busy” on one channel for some
minimum amount of time (which will depend on the
jamming radio), while giving an opportunity to transmis-
sions on the other channels to successfully finish.
5.2 System Model and Assumptions
Let us first introduce some notations. Let I denote the set of
nodes from the exposure region, which have the channel-
hopping capability and which have at least one channel-
hopping neighbor outside of the exposure region: In
Fig. 11a, I ¼ f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. Let O be the set of channel-
hopping nodes that reside outside of the exposure region
and that have at least one channel-hopping neighbor in the
exposure region: In Fig. 11a, O ¼ f6; 7; 8; 9; 10g. Also, let Ii
be the set of channel-hopping neighbors from I of
node i 2 O: In Fig. 11a, I6 ¼ f2; 4; 5g, I7 ¼ f2g, I8 ¼ f1g,
I9 ¼ f1; 3g, and I10 ¼ f4g.
We assume that there are ðmþ 1Þ orthogonal channels
available to the sensor nodes. One channel is reserved for
the normal mode of operation, i.e., when there is no attack.
We further assume that the nodes from the set I always
transmit, whereas the nodes from the set O are always in
the listening mode. Both the transmitting nodes and the
listening nodes randomly hop between different channels,
i.e., the probability of selecting any given channel for the
next hop is 1=m. We assume that an attacker knows this
strategy, including the channels allocated for hopping.
Further, we denote with Tp and Tl the duration of a
packet transmitted by node i 2 I and the period during
which node j 2 O is listening, respectively. By setting
Tl  2Tp, we can ensure that, even if j 2 O and i 2 Ij are
not synchronized, at least one packet of i will fall within
period Tl of listener j (see Fig. 11b). In our analysis, we set
Tl ¼ 2Tp.
We characterize the strength of the attacker by the
following two metrics: 1) channel sensing time Ts (i.e., the
time it takes to scan a given channel to detect some activity)
and 2) the number of channels,mj, that the attacker can jam
simultaneously. We denote with Tj the minimum jamming
period that the attacker has to jam a given transmission in
order to destroy the corresponding packet. Finally, we
define the jamming ratio ðjÞ as follows:
j ¼def Tj
Tp
 1: ð6Þ
The higher j is, the more resistant the packets are to
jamming. Note that our game makes sense only if the
jamming ratio is sufficiently high. In [10], Noubir and
Lin present a set of different coding strategies (based on
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes) that can achieve
j ¼ 0:1 0:15.
5.3 Attacking Strategies
We assume that the attacker does not have information
about potential collisions between multiple simultaneous
transmissions by nodes from set I; the less information
about set O the attacker has, the more realistic this
assumption is. We next derive a reasonable jamming
strategy for the attacker in our model.
Clearly, if the attacker visits (scans) a given “busy”
channel (occupied by transmission), it is optimal for him to
jam it. Otherwise, the attacker would not check this channel
in the first place. The attacker has two alternatives: 1) scan a
channel and then jam it if necessary and 2) jam every
channel visited (without scanning it). When scanning
channels, the attacker spends either Ts or Ts þ Tj per
channel, depending on whether the visited channel is busy
or not. This strategy is advantageous for the attacker if Ts <
Tj and if the attacker has fast enough hardware to sense the
channel. Otherwise, jamming every channel visited for the
duration Tj may be a better choice.
Let us now consider a fixed packet (carrying a report
about the attacker’s presence) that can potentially be
received by some listening node i 2 O. To destroy this
packet, the attacker needs to jam the channel on which the
packet is being transmitted before a fraction ð1 jÞ of the
packet has been transmitted because packets are “pro-
tected” with an LDPC code. Assuming that the attacker
adopts the strategy by which he simply jams every channel
visited, he has at most
k ¼ ð1 jÞTp
Tj
 
mj ¼ 1
j
 1
 
mj ð7Þ
chances to jam the “correct” channel (the one carrying the
fixed packet). Because transmitters choose their channels
uniformly at random (i.e., with probability 1=m,m being the
number of orthogonal channels) and, from the attacker’s
point of view, any packet transmitted can potentially be
received by some listening node (i.e., the attacker has no
information about set O, the set of listening nodes), the best
that he can do is to randomly choose k different channels (see
(7) above) and jam those channels for a duration of Tj. The
probability pjam that the attacker successfully jams the fixed
packet can thus be bounded as follows:
pjam  k
m
¼ 1
j
 1
 
mj
m
: ð8Þ
If the attacker chooses to scan channels before poten-
tially jamming the occupied ones, then pjam can be
approximated as min
ð1jÞTp
T
j k
mj
m ; 1
n o
, where T is the
expected time that the attacker spends per channel visited;
note that Ts  T  Tj þ Ts. Therefore, the attacker’s advan-
tage to successfully jam a fixed packet increases (at most)
linearly with mj (the number of channels that he can jam
simultaneously). As a countermeasure, the network opera-
tor can potentially increase the jamming ratio j, the
number of hopping channels m, and the number of
transmitting nodes ðjIjÞ. Note, however, that the values of
m and jIj should be carefully controlled in order to avoid
degradation in reporting performances due to the fact that
listening and transmitting nodes are not coordinated and
are likewise due to the increased number of simultaneous
transmissions.
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5.4 Performance Analysis
We carried out an evaluation of this approach using
simulations written in Matlab. For a given attacker, we
are interested in calculating the average number Nsucc of
time slots until the first report (from the exposure region
around the attacker) is received by any listening node
located outside the exposure region. Here, each time slot is
Tp long (i.e., equal to the time it takes to a sensor node to
transmit a packet).
In our simulations, we consider an optimal attacker who
knows in advance which channels are to be active, thus
avoiding the cost of visiting nonactive channels (equiva-
lently, the sensing time Ts ¼ 0). However, in these simula-
tions, we consider the case with mj ¼ 1 (i.e., the attacker
jams at most one channel at a time). We have implemented
the following attacking strategy: Every Tj period, the
attacker chooses one channel that has not been visited for
the longest time among currently active channels.
We perform the following experiment for 20 randomly
generated networks of size DD, with D ¼ 2;000: For
every network, we first deploy uniformly at random Nr
listening (relaying) nodes and Nt channel-hopping trans-
mitting nodes. Then, for every network, we randomly pick
the location of the attacker. The attacker’s location, together
with the radius of the exposure region Rs and the radius of
the transmission range Rt, define sets I and O. For each
such scenario and fixed number m of hopping channels, we
generate 50 random (hopping) schedules for both the
transmitting nodes (from set I) and the listening nodes
(from set O). We emulate desynchronization between the
nodes by randomly shifting the generated schedules in
time. For every set of random schedules, we record the time
slot at which the first packet from the exposure region is
successfully received by any node from O. We repeat our
experiments for a different number m of hopping channels.
For each fixed channel number, we average the results
across the 20 50 above experiments.
The results are presented in Figs. 12a and 12b with a
95 percent confidence interval. In Fig. 12a, we plot the
results for the case when the attacker is not active. From this
figure, we can observe that the average number Nsucc of
time slots before the first success increases in the number of
orthogonal channels m. It is important to observe that, for
m ¼ 1, we do not necessarily have collisions at the listening
nodes all the time. The reason is that, depending on the
node density, for some listening node i 2 O, we will have
jIij ¼ 1 with a high probability. Another important ob-
servation is that Nsucc decreases in the density of transmit-
ting nodes from set I (i.e., in Nt, for fixed D).
Next, we observe Nsucc in scenarios with an active
attacker. The results for j ¼ f0:1; 0:15g are shown in
Fig. 12b. Note that j ¼ 0:1 and j ¼ 0:15 imply that the
attacker can successfully jam at most 1=0:1 ¼ 10 and
1=0:15  7 packets during time period Tp. In this figure,
the curve obtained for Nt ¼ 2;500 and no attacker case
serves as a reference point. As expected, for the values of m
very close to (or lower than) 1j , Nsucc grows sharply,
essentially meaning that the network will fail to deliver
alarms. However, as m grows above 1j , the value of Nsucc
stabilizes at a reasonably small value. For example, for Nt ¼
3;000 and j ¼ 0:1, Nsuccjm¼15 ¼ 15 and Nsuccjm20  11.
From this figure, we further observe that, as we increase
the resistance of packets j to jamming, we can achieve a
significant reduction in Nsucc.
In Figs. 13a and 13b, we plot histogram (distribution) of
the number ðNsuccÞ of transmissions before the first success
for m ¼ 20. From the two figures, we can see that the
frequency of Nsucc resembles geometric distribution (a
somewhat expected result). On Fig. 13a, we can observe a
jump at Nsucc ¼ 70. This is because we round all the
realizations with Nsucc > 70 down to value of 70. Finally,
we can observe that a variance of theNsucc is much higher in
the case j ¼ 0:1 compared to j ¼ 0:15. This can be
explained by considering Nsucc as a geometric random
variable with variance VARðNsuccÞ, where V ARðNsuccÞ ¼
1ps
p2s
and ps is the probability that at least one report leaves
the jamming region in a single time slot of duration Tp. As
ps increases in j, variance VARðNsuccÞ simply decreases.
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Fig. 12. Average number Nsucc of time slots before the first packet is successfully received when (a) the attacker is not active (does not jam) and
(b) the attacker is active. We use a 95 percent confidence intervals.
6 RELATED WORK
Recently, the issues of jamming detection and prevention in
wireless sensor networks have received significant atten-
tion. In [3], Wood and Stankovic briefly study potential
techniques to avoid jammed regions. A more elaborate
study was presented by Wood et al. in [13]. In this work,
they propose a proactive protocol that first detects and then
maps the jammed area. In their approach, each node is
assumed to have a detection-module that periodically
returns a JAMMED or UNJAMMED message. The message
output by the detection module is then broadcast locally. In
our approach, however, we propose reactive solutions that
do not require periodic exchange of information. Xu et al.
[15] propose two countermeasures for coping with jam-
ming: coordinated channel-hopping and spatial retreats,
both of which require the nodes to be well synchronized
and coordinated. It is not clear whether the solution based
on spatial retreats is appropriate for sensor networks. In
[15], Xu et al. study the feasibility of reliably detecting
jamming attacks. They show that reliable detection can be a
challenging task in wireless sensor networks. Moreover, all
the proposed detection mechanisms are by their nature
proactive. In [10], Noubir and Lin show how to use low
density parity check (LDPC) codes to cope with jamming. In
[7], Karlof and Wagner introduce a new attack against
wireless sensor networks called sinkholes. In [9], McCune
et al. propose a scheme for the detection of denial-of-
message attacks on sensor network broadcasts.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described in detail how an attacker
can mask some events by stealthily jamming an appropriate
subset of the nodes. We have shown how these attacks can
be thwarted by means of probabilistic wormholes based on
wires, frequency hopping, and uncoordinated channel
hopping. We have developed appropriate mathematical
models for the solutions based on wired and frequency-
hopping pairs and we have quantified the probability of
success in all three solutions.
It is clear that the space of investigation in this area is
huge. Other solutions can be envisioned and, for the three
that we have presented, the influence of other parameters
can be studied. Yet, we believe that this work provides useful
insights on how to quantify the effectiveness of wormhole-
based defensemechanisms. In terms of futurework, it would
be interesting to evaluate the performance of hybrid
solutions by combining the three approaches proposed in
this paper. The effect of interference between nodes that
belong to two or more jamming regions (and its dependency
on the node density) is also a subject for future work.
APPENDIX
ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR THE SOLUTION BASED ON
WIRED PAIRS
For the given attacker, located at point ðxA; yAÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ, we
want to calculate the probability that at least one wormhole
exists from the corresponding exposure region into the
region not affected by the attacker’s jamming activity, i.e.,
P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ.
To model the random deployment of connected pairs, we
proceed as follows: Let us consider connected pair ð4; 5Þ in
Fig. 14. We first choose a point ðx4;5; y4;5Þ uniformly at
random from D. Next, we draw (or, rather, imagine) a
deployment disk of radius d=2 around the point ðx4;5; y4;5Þ
(Fig. 14). Finally, we choose two points ðx4; y4Þ and ðx5; y5Þ,
uniformly at random and independently, from the area
enclosed by the deployment disk centered at ðx4;5; y4;5Þ;
ðx4; y4Þ and ðx5; y5Þ then correspond to the positions of
connected nodes 4 and 5, respectively (Fig. 14). Note that
the deployment disk (with diameter d) ensures that the link
(wire) between nodes 4 and 5 does not exceed the
maximum length of d. This procedure is then repeated
(independently) for each of the K connected pairs to be
deployed.
More formally, with each connected pair ði; jÞ to be
deployed in the deployment region D, we can associate
three two-dimensional random variables: Pi;j ¼ ðXi;j; Yi;jÞ,
Pi ¼ ðXi; YiÞ, and Pj ¼ ðXj; YjÞ, where Xi;j 2 ½0; D and
Yi;j 2 ½0; D are uniform (continuous) random variables,
and ðXi; YiÞ and ðXj; YjÞ are (jointly continuous) uniform
random variables taking values from the set
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Fig. 13. Distribution of the “number of transmissions before the first success” for m ¼ 20 and (a) j ¼ 0:1 and (b) j ¼ 0:15. The number of
samples is 1,000.
fðx; yÞ : ðx xi;jÞ2 þ ðy yi;jÞ2  ðd=2Þ2;
for fixed ðxi;j; yi;jÞ 2 Dg:
Thus, for the given connected pair ði; jÞ, Pi;j describes the
location of the center point of the corresponding deploy-
ment disk, while Pi and Pj describe the locations of nodes i
and j, respectively.
Let us consider a single connected pair ðk; lÞ. To
calculate P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ, we first define
the following event:
S ¼def fthe connected pair ðk; lÞ forms a wormhole from the
exposure region around ðxA; yAÞ to the area not affected
by jammingg:
It is important to stress here that we require a wormhole
to always involve at least one regular node, even in cases
when the connected pair itself is sufficient to form a
wormhole from the jamming region (for example, this may
happen when d > Rs þRj).
Let P ½S be the probability of event S and let ps denote the
value of P ½S. Expression (1) in Section 3.2 gives a relation-
ship between P ½S and P ½at least one wormhole jðxA; yAÞ.
For this reason, we next calculate ps ¼ P ½S.
From the definition of the random variable
Pk;l ¼ ðXk;l; Yk;lÞ, we know that its probability density
function satisfies fPk;lðx; yÞ ¼ fXk;l;Yk;lðx; yÞ ¼ 1=D2. Then, by
the law of total probability, we can write for P ½S:
P ½S ¼
ZZ
ðx;yÞ2D
P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðx; yÞfPk;lðx; yÞdxdy: ð9Þ
Observe now that, for many points ðx; yÞ 2 D, we
will have P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðx; yÞ ¼ 0. For example, P ½SjPk;l ¼
ðx; yÞ ¼ 0 for all points ðx; yÞ that happen to be located far
enough from ðxA; yAÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ, that is, points for which
distfðx; yÞ; ð0; 0Þg > Rs þ d=2, where distfðx; yÞ; ð0; 0Þg is the
euclidian distance between points ðx; yÞ and ð0; 0Þ (see
Fig. 15a). Likewise, for d=2 < Rs, if
distððx; yÞ; ð0; 0ÞÞ < Rs  d=2;
then P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðx; yÞ ¼ 0 as well (see Fig. 15b). In this
case, since Rj  Rt þRs, neither node k nor node l can
reach any regular node that is located outside of the
jamming region. Therefore, using the polar coordinates
ðx; yÞ ¼ ðr cos ; r sin Þ, where r ¼ distfðx; yÞ; ð0; 0Þg, (9) can
be rewritten as follows:
P ½S ¼ 1
D2
ZZ
r2½r;Rsþd2
2½0;2
P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr cos ; r sin Þrdrd; ð10Þ
where r ¼ Rs  d2 if d2  Rs and r ¼ 0 if d2  Rs. For
notational simplicity, we will use P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ as the
shorthand for P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr cos ; r sin Þ.
We next calculate P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ to be able to calculate
P ½S from (10). For this, we need some additional notation.
We first define the following event:
W1  fone node of the connected pair ðk; lÞ is located
within the exposure region and the other is outside of
the exposure regiong:
For example, for connected pair ðk; lÞ ¼ ð1; 2Þ in Fig. 14,
event W1 has occurred. Furthermore, we define the
following event:
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Fig. 14. Approximation model for random deployment of connected pairs
(the thick curves connecting the nodes represent wires between the
nodes).
Fig. 15. Examples where connected pair ðk; lÞ cannot create a wormhole (note that only a part of the jamming region is shown). (a) An example
where connected pair ðk; lÞ cannot create a wormhole with Rs < d=2. (b) An example where connected pair ðk; lÞ cannot create a wormhole with
Rs > d=2.
W2  ffor the connected pair ðk; lÞ; there exists at least one
regular node that is located outside of the jamming region
but within the transmission range Rt of either k or lg:
For example, for connected pair ðk; lÞ ¼ ð1; 2Þ in Fig. 14,
eventW2 has occurred, since node 2 has regular node 3 that
is located within node 2’s radio transmission range and
outside of the jamming range. It is easily seen that, given
Rj  Rt þRs, event S happens if and only if both event W1
and eventW2 happen, i.e., S W1 ^W2. From this, we have
the following:
P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ ¼ P ½W1;W2jPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ
¼ P ½W1jPk;l ¼ ðr; ÞP ½W2jW1;Pk;l ¼ ðr; Þ:
ð11Þ
Since the positions of peer nodes k and l are chosen
randomly and independently in the corresponding deploy-
ment disk (of radius d=2) centered at ðx; yÞ ¼ ðr cos ; r sin Þ,
we have:
P ½W1jPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ ¼ 2 jA1ðr; Þjðd=2Þ2 
ðd=2Þ2 jA1ðr; Þj
ðd=2Þ2 ;
ð12Þ
where A1ðr; Þ is the set of points ðx; yÞ 2 D that are located
in the intersection region obtained as the intersection between
the deployment disk (of the pair ðk; lÞ) centered at ðx; yÞ ¼
ðr cos ; r sin Þ and the exposure region (see Fig. 16), and
jA1ðr; Þj denotes the area (not the set size) of this
intersection region.
From Fig. 16, we can observe that jA1ðr; Þj ¼ jA1ðrÞj, i.e.,
the area jA1ðr; Þj does not depend on ; note that this is the
consequence of setting ðxA; yAÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ and our assumption
that jamming and exposure regions are contained comple-
tely within the deployment area.3 The value of jA1ðrÞj can
be computed by the well-known formula for the area of
circle-to-circle intersection.
Next, we evaluate the conditional probability
P ½W2jW1;Pk;l ¼ ðr; Þ:
Since event W1 has happened, it means that one node from
the observed pair ðk; lÞ resides in the exposure region (say
node k) and the other one (node l) is located outside of the
exposure region. But, this implies that node k has no
neighbors among regular nodes that are located outside of
the jamming region. Then, the event W2 conditioned on W1
(which we denote with ~W2) actually reads:
~W2  fnode l has at least one neighboring regular node that
is located outside of the jamming regiong: :
Therefore,
P ½W2jW1;Pk;l ¼ ðr; Þ ¼ P ½ ~W2jPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ: ð13Þ
Let us denote with Diskk;lðr; Þ the set of all the points
from the pair ðk; lÞ’s deployment disk, centered at ðx; yÞ ¼
ðr cos ; r sin Þ (see Fig. 16). Then, by the law of total
probability, we have:
P ½ ~W2jPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ ¼
ZZ
ðx;yÞ2 A1ðr;Þ
P ½ ~W2jPl ¼ ðx; yÞ
 fPlðx; yÞdxdy; ð14Þ
where A1ðr; Þ ¼ Diskk;lðr; Þ A1ðr; Þ, Pl is the two-
dimensional random variable describing the location of
node l, and fPlðx; yÞ is the probability density function of
the location of node l, that is,
fPlðx; yÞ ¼
1
A1ðr; Þ
		 		 ¼ 1ðd=2Þ2 jA1ðrÞj ¼
def
fPlðrÞ: ð15Þ
Recall that jA1ðr; Þj ¼ jA1ðrÞj (see Fig. 16).
Since the regular nodes are deployed uniformly at
random in D, we have, for ðx; yÞ 2 A1ðr; Þ,
P ½ ~W2jPl ¼ ðx; yÞ ¼ 1 1 jA2ðx; yÞj
D2

 n
 1 enjA2ðx;yÞj=D2 ;
ð16Þ
where A2ðx; yÞ is the set of points from the node l’s
transmission region, which does not fall in the jamming
region (see Fig. 16), jA2ðx; yÞj is the area of this region, andn is
the number of regular nodes deployed. Note that the approx-
imation in (16) is valid for large n and jA2ðx; yÞj 	 D2.
Now, by combining (11)–(16), we can calculate
P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ as follows:
P ½SjPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ
¼ð1Þ P ½W1jPk;l ¼ ðr; ÞP ½W2jW1;Pk;l ¼ ðr; Þ
¼ð2Þ P ½W1jPk;l ¼ ðr; ÞP ½ ~W2jPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ
¼ð3Þ P ½W1jPk;l ¼ ðr; Þ
ZZ
ðx;yÞ2 A1ðr;Þ
P ½ ~W2jPl ¼ ðx; yÞfPlðx; yÞdxdy
¼ð4Þ P ½W1jPk;l ¼ ðr; ÞfPlðrÞ
ZZ
ðx;yÞ2 A1ðr;Þ
P ½ ~W2jPl ¼ ðx; yÞdxdy
¼ð5Þ 2 jA1ðrÞjðd=2Þ2
ðd=2Þ2 jA1ðrÞj
ðd=2Þ2 
1
ðd=2Þ2 jA1ðrÞj

ZZ
ðx;yÞ2 A1ðr;Þ
P ½ ~W2jPl ¼ ðx; yÞdxdy
ð6Þ 32jA1ðrÞjðd2Þ2
ZZ
ðx;yÞ2 A1ðr;Þ
1 enjA2ðx;yÞjD2
 
dxdy;
ð17Þ
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Fig. 16. Definition of regions A1ðr; Þ and A2.
3. By relaxing this assumption, intersection areas A1 take more complex
forms, which significantly increases the complexity of their evaluation.
where (1) follows from the (11), (2) follows from (13), (3)
follows from (14), (4) follows from the fact that, for fixed r,
the probability density function fPlðrÞ is a constant (see the
(15)), (5) follows from (12) and (15) and the fact that the area
jA1ðrÞj is independent of , and, finally, (6) follows from the
approximation in (16).
Finally, by plugging (17) into (10), we obtain
P ½S  64
D2d4
Z
r2½r;Rsþd2ZZ
ðx;yÞ2 A1ðrÞ
1 enjA2ðx;yÞjD2
 
dxdy
( )
jA1ðrÞjrdr;
ð18Þ
where we used the fact that jA2ðx; yÞj (and, therefore,
f1 expðnjA2ðx; yÞj=D2Þg) is independent of  (see Fig. 16).
Due to the complex expressions for areas jA1ðrÞj and
jA2ðx; yÞj, analytically integrating the resulting expression
for P ½S is very hard. For this reason, in Section 3.3, we
solve (18) numerically and validate it by simulations.
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